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So You’ve Been Preempted—What Are You Going to
Do Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal
Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
Home ownership is the foundation upon which the “American
dream” is built; the goal of owning a home remains high on the list
of priorities for Americans young and old.1 In April 2000, 70.7
million American families (67.1%) owned their homes, more than
ever before in our nation’s history.2 Although many factors likely
contributed to those record levels, the increased availability of
subprime credit was one important cause;3 the ability of individuals
with blemished credit histories to obtain credit was never greater.
The total dollar amount of subprime loans increased fourfold from
$40 billion in 1994 to $160 billion in 1999,4 with the subprime

1. See Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact and Responses: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 53–54 (2001)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa).
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 1 (2000), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/treasrpt.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004)
[hereinafter TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT].
3. Subprime lending involves lending to individuals who are unable to qualify for the
best available interest rates (prime rates). “Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit
histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems such as
charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity as
measured by credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass
borrowers with incomplete credit histories.” BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF
THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001).
4. KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING vii (2000) (“A number of factors
accounted for this growth: federal legislation preempting state restrictions on allowable rates
and loan features, the tax reform act of 1986 [sic], increased demand for and availability of
consumer debt, and an increase in subprime securitization.”). Another report states that the
number of subprime loans increased from 80,000 in 1993 to over 790,000 in 1998, with
subprime loans increasing from a $20 billion portion of the overall mortgage market to a
$150 billion portion over the same period. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA
(2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/subprime.html (last
visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN].
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market comprising “a little more than ten percent of the [overall]
mortgage market.”5 Although increased subprime lending
contributed to that encouraging increase in home ownership, not all
the consequences have been positive. As subprime loan originations
have increased, so too have “predatory” loan practices.6
While individuals, consumer groups, state and federal
government agencies, and state and federal politicians have become
increasingly concerned about such practices and have called for
changes in the way mortgage lending is regulated, they do not agree
on the shape such changes should take.7 In particular, state and
federal government approaches to the problem are not in accord.
State and local governments have enacted laws that combat
predatory loan practices by regulating banks and banking subsidiaries

5. AMY CREWS CUTTS & ROBERT A. VAN ORDER, FREDDIE MAC, ON THE
ECONOMICS OF SUBPRIME LENDING 1 (Freddie Mac, Office of the Chief Economist, 2003).
6. See infra Part II.A (explaining what predatory lending is and providing examples of
such practices).
7. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1 (discussing the predatory lending problem and
various responses to it); Letter from Neil A. Milner, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, to the Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of
the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1–11 (March 28, 2003) (opposing
federal preemption of state predatory lending laws, specifically the Georgia Fair Lending Act,
and arguing that states have the power to regulate national and state banks); Notice, National
City Bank, 68 Fed. Reg. 46264 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter GFLA Preemption
Determination] (preempting the Georgia Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered
banks and concluding that Georgia’s act interferes with national bank real estate lending
powers).
One major difficulty in regulating the subprime market is that the subprime market,
while fertile ground for predatory and unfair lending practices, is also a vital source of credit.
Regulating the subprime lending market without cutting off access to its credit resources is not
an easy task. As explained by a witness at congressional hearings held regarding the predatory
lending issue, “[d]rying up productive credit would be of grave concern; drying up destructive
debt is sound economic and public policy.” Hearings, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa). A recent Department of Housing and
Urban Development report described the value of subprime lending, illustrating the
importance of not damaging or eliminating it through overly intrusive regulation, as follows:
By providing loans to borrowers who do not meet the credit standards for
borrowers in the prime market, subprime lending can and does serve a critical role in
the Nation’s economy. These borrowers may have blemishes in their credit record,
insufficient credit history or non-traditional credit sources. Through the subprime
loan market, they can buy a new home, improve their existing home, or refinance
their mortgage to increase their cash on hand.
UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 4, at 1.
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operating within their borders,8 only to have their efforts preempted
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).9 For instance, the OCC
recently issued a preemption order and determination that the
substantive provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act (“GFLA”),
which prohibits various loan terms and features that the Georgia
legislature deemed undesirable,10 does not apply to nationally
chartered banks and their subsidiaries.11 The OCC determination,
combined with the GFLA’s parity provision (which makes the GFLA
inapplicable to state banks if a federal regulatory agency determines
that the GFLA does not apply to nationally chartered banks),12
makes the GFLA ineffective against all bank lenders in Georgia.13
These federal regulatory agencies have expressed concern that state
predatory lending regulations, such as the GFLA, interfere with the
ability of national financial institutions to regulate real estate
finance.14 State and local policymakers, however, insist that federal
laws and regulations are not strict enough.15 As the problem of

8. See, e.g., GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7 (preempting the Georgia
Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered banks); Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2002) (amended 2003).
9. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck,
Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury (Jan. 21, 2003)
(concluding that federal law preempts application of various provisions of the Georgia Fair
Lending Act to federal savings associations and their operating subsidiaries), at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56301.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter OTS
GFLA Preemption Letter]; Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift
Supervision, Department of the Treasury (July 22, 2003) (concluding that federal law
preempts application of various provisions of the New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of
2002 to federal savings associations and their operating subsidiaries), at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56305.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter OTS
NJHOSA Preemption Letter].
10. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13.
11. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; see also infra Part III.
12. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-12 (stating that the provisions of the GFLA will not
apply to state-chartered financial institutions to the “extent federal law precludes or preempts
or has been determined to preclude or preempt the application of the provisions of this chapter
to any federally chartered bank”).
13. See Memorandum from Bo Fears, Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia, to
David Sorrell, Commissioner, Department of Banking and Finance, State of Georgia (Aug. 4,
2003) (explaining that the OCC’s preemption order is a preemption determination within the
meaning of the GFLA’s parity provision, which, according to the GFLA’s parity provision,
leads to the conclusion that the GFLA does not apply to state banks).
14. See infra Parts III.A–B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
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predatory lending continues and federal agencies show a willingness
to preempt state regulations that affect nationally chartered financial
institutions, states are left with fewer options for protecting at-risk
consumers in the subprime market.
This Comment discusses this problem and suggests that states
may reduce abusive subprime lending, in spite of federal orders
preempting their legislative and regulatory efforts, by improving
regulation of nonbank loan sellers and increasing enforcement of
state deceptive and unfair trade practices acts. Part II defines
predatory lending, discusses why it is a problem, and briefly recounts
current federal and state remedies. Part III outlines the reasoning
behind the OCC’s recent order and determination, which preempts
the GFLA and sets the stage for future orders preempting state
predatory lending laws. It also briefly outlines OTC preemption
orders that have determined that the GFLA and a similar New Jersey
predatory lending law are not applicable to federally chartered
savings and thrift associations or their subsidiaries.16 Part IV provides
two suggested solutions for states seeking to develop effective tactics
for fighting predatory lending practices without running afoul of
preemption concerns: the increased regulation of nonbank sellers of
loans (primarily mortgage brokers who often operate outside federal
and state regulatory structures), and increased enforcement of state
deceptive and unfair trade practices acts (such as mini-FTC acts).
Though many approaches can be taken,17 these remedies address the
problem effectively, cannot be preempted by federal regulatory
agencies, and are better suited to address state predatory lending
problems than blanket federal regulation. They can also be tailored
to address the needs of various jurisdictions and applied to
transactions that are truly predatory without restricting access to
legitimate subprime credit. Part V offers a conclusion.18

16. See OTS GFLA Preemption Letter, supra note 9; OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter,
supra note 9.
17. Such approaches include heightened federal standards under such laws as the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2000), the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000), increased borrower education, and further
regulation by state and local legislatures through the enactment of new predatory lending laws.
18. This Comment seeks to provide solutions to the predatory lending problem that can
be followed by state legislators and regulators without fear of preemption by federal law. The
suggestions made in this Comment are not exhaustive, and additional action may be necessary
at both state and federal levels to combat abusive lending practices.
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II. WHAT IS PREDATORY LENDING AND WHY IS IT HARMFUL?
A. Defining Predatory Lending
Defining predatory lending is difficult.19 Any list of predatory
practices is incomplete because such a “list does not consider the
context in which the alleged abuse has occurred.”20 Although certain
lending practices may be abusive when sold as part of a high-cost
subprime loan if the borrower is deceived or misled, the same
practices are not abusive in other high-cost situations if the borrower
understands the otherwise abusive term or practice and the loan is
negotiated as part of an arms-length transaction.21 When
determining whether a loan or its terms are predatory, all of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction must be considered.22

19. Although defining predatory lending in an objective way is not easy, it helps to
recognize what predatory lending is not: legitimate subprime lending. Subprime lending is an
important source of financing for those with imperfect credit and has provided a way for many
people to become homeowners who would have otherwise been unable. Hearings, supra note
1, at 311 (statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Central Pacific Mortgage
Company, Folsom, California, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of America)
(“[Subprime lending] has been extremely beneficial to thousands of families in the last couple
of years. Subprime lending has opened up new markets and helped many consumers that
would not have received needed funds but for the special products available in this sector of
the market. The subprime market provides a legitimate and much needed source of credit for
many families.”). Subprime lending
refers to entirely appropriate and legal lending to borrowers who do not qualify for
prime rates, those rates reserved for borrowers with virtually blemish-free credit
histories. Premiums for extending credit to these borrowers compensate lenders for
the increased risk that they incur and range several percentage points over rates
charged on prime loans.
Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Address at the Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference, Ann
Arbor, Michigan (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2002/20020118/default.htm.
20. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
21. Id. As one commentator stated,
In its reliance on a ‘I know it when I see it’ kind of test, predatory lending is similar
to obscenity. Just as two observers may differ over whether a picture is obscene, they
may also differ over whether a particular practice is abusive. And just as there is no
end to the sources of obscene expression, there is no end to the list of lending
practices that could be used in abusive fashion.
JACK GUTTENTAG, ANOTHER VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 5 (Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa.,
Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 01-23-B, 2001), available at http://fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0123.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004).
22. As explained by one witness at congressional hearings about the predatory lending
issue, the full context of the transaction must be analyzed to properly assess whether an abuse
has occurred:
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In spite of the difficulty in definitively and objectively defining
predatory lending, some practices are definitely considered predatory
in certain circumstances. Such practices include aggressive sales
techniques, deceit, fraud, manipulation, or any number of the
foregoing, “often combined with loan terms that, alone or in
combination, are abusive or make the borrower more vulnerable to
abusive practices.”23 Loan terms and practices that are often
considered abusive when offered in a “predatory” context include:
(1) loan “flipping,”24 (2) making loans without considering the
borrower’s ability to repay and primarily for the purpose of obtaining
the collateral,25 (3) negative amortization loans,26 (4) the use of
It is impossible, for example, to identify “excessive” fees without knowing the
nature and difficulty of the service provided in exchange for that fee. Nor can we
recognize repeat refinances that are meant to strip equity without looking at the fee
structure of the transaction and the equity of the consumer. In order to determine
that a consumer has been “deliberately misled,” we have to study the disclosures and
the oral representations made in the context of the specific transaction at hand.
Since every loan is unique and every transaction is tailored to specific needs and
conditions, the answer of whether mortgage abuse has occurred in any given
situation is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances of the borrower and
the transaction. It is daunting, therefore, to isolate the specific “bad acts” that are
employed by unscrupulous lenders in a way that allows for appropriate regulation.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 312 (statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Central
Pacific Mortgage Company, Folsom, California, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of
America).
23. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
24. Loan “flipping” is frequent refinancing done in order to get additional fees or other
lender-favorable terms that have little or no benefit, economic or otherwise, to the borrower.
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 515 (2002) (defining “flipping” as “the early or
frequent refinancing of a loan, normally with each new set of loan fees financed by the loan, so
that the loan amount continually rises, even while the homeowner makes her payments”). The
Treasury-HUD Joint Report also states:
Loan flipping generally refers to repeated refinancing of a mortgage loan within a
short period of time with little or no benefit to the borrower. Loan flipping typically
occurs when borrower [sic] is unable to meet scheduled payments, or repeatedly
consolidates other unsecured debts into a new, home-secured loan at the urging of a
lender. Lenders who flip loans tend to charge high origination fees with each
successive refinancing, and may charge these fees based on the entire amount of the
new loan, not on just the incremental amount (if any) added to the loan principal
through the refinancing.
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
25. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. This practice, also often
called “asset-based lending,” was recognized as a problem and condemned by the TreasuryHUD Joint Report:
A creditor’s decision on whether to originate a mortgage loan should be guided by
his/her assessment of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan from liquid sources
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excessive prepayment penalties,27 (5) balloon payments,28 (6) the use
of mandatory arbitration clauses,29 (7) fee “packing,”30 and (8)

(e.g., income and non-housing assets). Other factors, such as the overall size of the
loan, the borrower’s credit history and the value of the collateral play into the
decision as well. There is widespread concern, however, that some unscrupulous
creditors are making loans to borrowers who clearly cannot afford to repay them. . . .
Lending with no reasonable expectation of repayment other than recourse to the
underlying collateral is not a practice engaged in by safe and sound lenders.
Similarly, responsible mortgage brokers do not broker loans to borrowers where the
borrower can’t repay. Asset-based lending can have significant social implications,
particularly in home-secured transactions. Borrowers not only risk losing their
homes to foreclosure, but also their accumulated equity in their homes, a major
source of wealth for many Americans.
Id. at 76–77. The OCC also recognizes the problem of asset-based lending, noting that such
practices are a fundamental characteristic of predatory loans. Abusive loans are often
“underwritten predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the collateral, without
regard to the borrower’s ability to service and repay the loan according to its terms absent
resorting to that collateral.” Advisory Letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices to Chief Executive Officers of All National Banks and National Bank Operating
Subsidiaries, Department & Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel 2 (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf [hereinafter OCC Predatory
Abuses Guidelines Letter].
26. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 91–92. Negative amortization
loans are loans that are structured so that the borrower pays less than the amount of interest
due on the loan so that the principal amount of the debt increases. Id. at 91. This causes the
borrower to lose equity in her home, and “[t]he existence of such a schedule . . . may indicate
a lack of understanding on the part of the borrower or misleading lender practices.” Id. at 92.
27. Prepayment penalties are “fees that are added to the amount the borrower must pay
to retire a loan before it reaches full term.” Eggert, supra note 24, at 518. Early payment of a
loan reduces the amount of interest lenders receive on a given loan, and prepayment penalties
are therefore intended to reduce early payment. Id. “[W]hen employed by predatory lenders,
prepayment penalties are designed either to trap the borrower, forcing her to remain in an
inequitable loan, or to reward the lender with an unreasonable payoff when an unwitting
borrower refinances the loan.” Id. See also TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at
92–96 (discussing prepayment penalties and their effects on borrowers).
28. Balloon payments are large payments that are due “at the end of a fixed-rate loan
term when regular monthly payments do not fully amortize the loan principal.” TREASURYHUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. Such payments “force a borrower at a set time to
repay all of the remaining balance on a loan rather than continuing to make monthly payments
until the entire loan has been repaid.” Eggert, supra note 24, at 519. When the balloon
payment comes due, “borrowers are highly unlikely to be able to pay off a sizeable balloon
payment without refinancing the loan, thus incurring a new round of points and fees.” Id.
29. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 98–99.
30. Fee “packing” generally refers to the inclusion of excessive or unnecessary fees and
points being financed into the loan amount. Eggert, supra note 24, at 517. “‘Packing’ is the
practice of forcing or inducing borrowers to use some of their loan proceeds to pay for
unnecessary or undesired products . . . . Predatory lenders try to include as many such products
as they can, such as insurance to pay off credit card debt or to service home appliances.” Id.
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steering individuals that would otherwise qualify for low-cost prime
loans into high-cost subprime loans.31
B. Why Is Predatory Lending a Problem?
Predatory lending is problematic because predatory lenders often
seek out those who are least able to deal with the burdens that
onerous loans impose, such as the elderly and minorities (due to
economic constraints).32 Additionally, predatory lending, and
regulatory responses to it, cause disruptions in the secondary market

Predatory lenders engage in such practices because they directly benefit from receiving higher
fees and “obtain profits from selling these overpriced products.” Id.
One product that predatory lenders “pack” into loans and that is often harmful to
borrowers is single premium credit insurance. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note
2, at 89–90. Upon death or disability of the borrower, credit insurance pays off the balance of
the mortgage. Id. at 89. Premiums for such insurance are often paid in a lump-sum at closing
and are financed as part of the loan, increasing finance charges and providing “no actuarial
benefit to the consumer” since the policy is in effect for only the first few years of the loan. Id.
at 90. In some cases,
lenders may mislead consumers into believing that credit insurance is a requirement
for approval of the loan. An industry-funded report found that 18 percent of those
surveyed did not remember being told that credit insurance was optional. In some
instances, borrowers have been unaware that they have purchased credit insurance.
Even if borrowers understand that they are purchasing the product and do so
voluntarily, the lender may mislead the consumer into thinking that coverage is for
the entire life of the mortgage when the policy is only in effect for the first five to
seven years of the loan.
Id.
31. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1266 (2002). Engel & McCoy would
describe the practice of steering individuals into higher cost loans as “harmful rent-seeking,”
which they argue is a defining characteristic of predatory lenders and lending practices. Id. at
1265–67 (“The practice of steering prime borrowers to high-cost lenders is an example of
pricing that is designed to extract harmful rents.”).
32. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. Governor Gramlich noted
that “groups that have disproportionately been prey for unscrupulous creditors are women,
minorities, and lower-income households. The activities, referred to collectively as predatory
lending, are a scourge on the mortgage industry.” Gramlich, supra note 19.
A recent HUD report concluded that subprime lending and its accompanying abuses
occur much more often in low-income neighborhoods: “In low-income neighborhoods,
subprime loans accounted for 26 percent of total loans in 1998—compared with only
11 percent in moderate-income neighborhoods and just 7 percent in upper-income
neighborhoods. Comparable 1993 figures were 3 percent in low-income neighborhoods and
1 percent each in moderate-income and upper-income neighborhoods.” UNEQUAL BURDEN,
supra note 4, at 2. Subprime loans are over three times more likely in low-income
neighborhoods than high-income neighborhoods. Id.
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for home loans, which disruptions may decrease the availability of
credit.
Unscrupulous lenders often target the elderly because they
typically have substantial equity in their homes.33 According to the
AARP, “[n]early 80 percent of older Americans are homeowners,
and 80 percent of these older homeowners own their homes free and
clear [of any liens]. . . . [O]ver 60 percent of homeowners age 65
and older had at least $50,000 in home equity.”34 Elderly
homeowners are often cash poor, live on fixed incomes, and have
substantial medical problems, as well as “diminished faculties, and
isolation that impair their ability to understand loan terms and/or
make them especially vulnerable to aggressive sales tactics.”35 These
unique circumstances and vulnerabilities place the elderly in a
particularly precarious position and often make them easier targets
for predatory lenders.
Increased levels of subprime lending in minority communities
suggest that such communities may be subject to increased lending
abuses. The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) reported that five times more subprime
loans are originated in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods than white neighborhoods.36 While not all subprime
lending is predatory, and “subprime lending is an important element
of our financial system[] because it delivers credit to those that may
otherwise be unable to obtain credit,” the subprime market “appears
more susceptible to abusive lending practices than is the prime
market. A subprime borrower may have few financial options

33. See Gramlich, supra note 19 (explaining that “lenders often target elderly
homeowners, who tend to have the highest levels of equity in their homes”).
34. MIKE CALHOUN ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., HOME LOAN PROTECTION
ACT, A MODEL STATUTE 5 (2001).
35. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 72; see also James H. Carr &
Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES:
ISSUES AND ANSWERS 32–33 (Fannie Mae Foundation ed., 2001) (explaining that predatory
lenders often target elderly homeowners and “people with limited education who are not adept
in financial matters and lack the financial sophistication to scrutinize loans,” and discussing
fraudulent practices used against such groups).
36. “In predominantly black neighborhoods, the high-cost subprime lending accounted
for 51 percent of home loans in 1998—compared with only 9 percent in predominately white
areas. Comparable 1993 figures were 8 percent in black neighborhoods and 1 percent in white
neighborhoods.” UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 4, at 2.
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available or less information on loan terms and conditions and less
opportunity to shop for the best terms and conditions available.”37
In addition to the social problems predatory lending causes,
predatory lending practices and the regulatory responses they have
elicited have created market disruptions that may counteract efforts
to increase home ownership by decreasing the availability of credit.
In response to state and local regulations that impose restrictions on
high-cost home loans and attempt to stop abusive practices, some
lenders have withdrawn from the secondary market where securitized
home loans are sold and which provides the main source of funding
for the home mortgage market.38 For instance, in response to the
enactment of Georgia’s initial Fair Lending Act, which prohibited

37. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 51. The Treasury-HUD report
explained further the connection between subprime lending and predatory practices as follows:
Evidence of predatory lending practices generally arises from the subprime mortgage
market. While predatory lending can occur in the prime market, such practices are
for the most part effectively deterred by competition among lenders, greater
homogeneity in loan terms and the prime borrowers’ greater familiarity with
complex financial transactions. In combination, these factors make prime borrowers
more likely to shop for the best loan terms and less likely to fall victim to predatory
loans. In addition, many prime lenders are banks, thrifts, and credit unions that are
subject to extensive oversight and regulation by federal and state governments.
The subprime market, in contrast, provides much more fertile ground for
predatory lending practices. Several factors contribute to this result.
The characteristics of many subprime borrowers make them more easily
manipulated and misled by unscrupulous actors. Many subprime borrowers who
have had difficulty obtaining credit in the past may underestimate their ability to
obtain new sources of credit, which may make them more likely to accept the first
offer of credit they receive, rather than shop for a loan with the best possible terms.
In addition, subprime borrowers may be more in need of immediate funds due to
the heightened challenge of meeting household and emergency expenses on their
lower incomes.
Many subprime borrowers live in low-income and minority communities that
are comparatively underserved by traditional prime lenders. As a result, many of
these communities suffer from insufficient competition among lenders, so that
better loan terms may be harder to find, or persons may be unaware of them.
The subprime mortgage and finance companies that dominate mortgage
lending in many low-income and minority communities, while subject to the same
consumer protection laws, are not subject to as much federal oversight as their
prime market counterparts—who are largely federally-supervised banks, thrifts, and
credit unions. The absence of such accountability may create an environment where
predatory practices flourish because they are unlikely to be detected.
Id. at 17–18.
38. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL STATEN, REGULATION OF SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S PREDATORY LENDING LAW 2
(Credit Research Center, McDonough Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 66, 2002).

710

CHI-FIN

701]

7/16/2004 5:13 PM

Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes

high-cost loans and imposed liability on lenders that made such loans
and on those that purchased them, Moody’s Investors Service
concluded that “including GFLA-covered loans in securitizations
was too risky, causing lenders to scale back loans in the state and
leading issuers to remove Georgia loans from securitizations.”39
Standard and Poor’s also announced that it would no longer rate
mortgage-backed securities that included Georgia mortgage loans.40
Government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both
major purchasers of securitized loans and an important capital source
for the credit markets, have also taken measures aimed at reducing
the possibility of purchasing abusive loans and have refused to
purchase loans that are considered high-cost based upon federal
standards.41
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE GFLA AND
OTHER STATE LAWS: THE DOOR IS OPEN
Although both federal and state regulators and legislators have
taken aim at predatory practices and attempted to stop them through
various regulatory devices, controversy still exists about who should
regulate such practices and to what extent.42 Federal agencies,
particularly the OCC and the OTS,43 have expressed concern that
state predatory lending regulation interferes with the ability of
national financial institutions to make real estate loans and have
issued determinations that certain state predatory lending laws,

39. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46278.
40. Id.
41. See generally FREDDIE MAC, PROTECTING BORROWERS FROM PREDATORY
LENDING PRACTICES (2002), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
affordhouse/predlend/apl_fact.html; Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Chairman
Announces New Loan Guidelines to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/ 2000/0710.html.
42. See generally Hearings, supra note 1 (discussing the predatory lending problem and
various responses to it); Milner, supra note 7 (opposing federal preemption of state predatory
lending laws, specifically the Georgia Fair Lending Act, and arguing that states have the power
to regulate national and state banks); GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7
(preempting the Georgia Fair Lending Act as it applies to federally chartered banks and
concluding that Georgia’s act interferes with national bank real estate lending powers); Robert
M. Jaworski, Legislating Against Bad Loans: The State/Local Battleground, 58 BUS. LAW.
1228, 1242 (2003) (discussing various state and local attempts to regulate predatory loans and
suggesting that such attempts make it difficult for lenders to operate efficiently).
43. The OCC and OTS are charged with regulating nationally chartered banks and
nationally chartered savings and thrift associations, respectively.
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notably the GFLA, do not apply to nationally chartered financial
institutions.44 State and local policymakers, on the other hand, insist
that federal laws and regulations are not strict enough and have
enacted new laws and regulations to address the problem.45 Sections
A and B of this Part discuss the scope of the OCC and OTS
preemption decisions, respectively, demonstrating that state
predatory lending legislation similar to that enacted by Georgia can
no longer address the predatory lending problem effectively. Section
C then outlines the reasons why exclusive federal regulation in this
area would not be sufficient to stop the predatory lending problem
and why, therefore, states should be allowed to regulate in the ways
suggested in Part IV.46
A. The OCC’s Preemption of the GFLA
In spite of states’ concerns and desire to regulate in this area, the
OCC has become increasingly unwilling to allow state predatory
lending laws to operate against federally chartered banks. Notably,
the OCC recently released a preemption order and determination
that the GFLA does not apply to nationally chartered banks or their
subsidiaries that operate within Georgia.47

44. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7; OTS GFLA Preemption Letter,
supra note 9; OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, supra note 9.
45. See generally Jaworski, supra note 42 (discussing various state and local attempts to
regulate predatory loans).
46. The purpose of this Comment is not to analyze the substantive correctness of the
OCC and OTS preemption determinations. Although the propriety of those decisions is
arguable, their correctness is conceded for the purposes of this Comment. This Comment
simply seeks to provide solutions to the predatory lending problem that can be followed by
state legislators and regulators without fear of preemption by federal law. The propositions
made here allow states to continue efforts to stop predatory lending in spite of the OCC’s and
OTS’s willingness to preempt state statutes aimed at predatory lending, even if the OCC
determines, based on its recently proposed rulemaking discussed below, that it occupies the
field of real estate lending regulation with respect to national banks. Because the federal
government has not and arguably cannot produce a solution that will fully address the
predatory lending problem, states must seek remedies for the problem, such as those suggested
here, that cannot be preempted by federal regulators.
47. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46281 (concluding that “the
GFLA does not apply to National City or any other national bank or national bank operating
subsidiary that engages in real estate lending activities in Georgia”).
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1. Background
The GFLA was enacted in 2002 as Georgia’s bid to stop
predatory lending, which Georgia legislators perceived to be an
increasing problem.48 It prohibits the financing of single premium
credit accident, health, or life insurance,49 places limitations on late
payment charges and fees,50 prohibits “flipping” and provides for
damages for victims of such practices,51 and places other substantial
limitations on loans that are defined by the act as “high-cost.”52
In response to the GFLA’s restrictions, National City Bank, a
nationally chartered bank incorporated in Indiana that was an active
lender in Georgia, sought a determination from the OCC that the

48. Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2002) (amended
2003). The GFLA was amended in 2003 in response to criticisms from various lending
interests.
49. Id. § 7-6A-3(1). The statute provides:
No creditor shall make a home loan that finances, directly or indirectly:
(A) Any credit life, credit accident, credit health, credit personal property, or
credit loss-of-income insurance, debt suspension coverage, or debt cancellation
coverage, whether or not such coverage is insurance under applicable law, that
provides for cancellation of all or part of a borrower’s liability in the event of loss of
life, health, personal property, or income or in the case of accident written in
connection with a home loan; or
(B) Any life, accident, health, or loss-of-income insurance without regard to the
identity of the ultimate beneficiary of such insurance; provided, however, that for the
purposes of this Code section, any premiums or charges calculated and paid on a
monthly basis shall not be considered financed directly or indirectly by the creditor.
Id.
50. Id. § 7-6A-3(3).
51. Id. § 7-6A-4. Subpart (a) of §7-6A-4 provides:
No creditor may knowingly or intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of
“flipping” a home loan. Flipping a home loan is the consummating of a high cost
home loan to a borrower that refinances an existing home loan that was
consummated within the prior five years when the new loan does not provide
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances
including, but not limited to, the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the
cost of the new loan, and the borrower’s circumstances.
Id. § 7-6A-4(a). Also, damages are available for violations. Id. § 7-6A-4(c).
52. Id. § 7-6A-5. Some of the limitations this section places on high-cost loans include
limitations on prepayment fees (§7-6A-5(1)), on loan terms that call for an increase in interest
rates after default (§7-6A-5(4)), and on the ability of a lender to make a loan before the
borrower has received counseling from an approved, independent third-party (§7-6A-5(7)).
The section also prohibits a creditor from making a high-cost home loan “unless a reasonable
creditor would believe at the time the loan is consummated that the borrower residing in the
home will be able to make the scheduled payments” based upon the borrower’s financial
situation. Id. § 7-6A-5(8).
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GFLA did not apply to it or its operating subsidiaries.53 In its
request, National City Bank asserted “that the GFLA is preempted
under various provisions of federal law and that, accordingly, the
OCC should conclude that the Georgia law does not apply to it.”54
After notice to the public and an opportunity for comment on the
issue, the OCC handed down an order which concluded that the
substantive provisions of the GFLA do not apply to any nationally
chartered banking institution operating within Georgia or any
subsidiary of such a nationally chartered bank.55
2. Rationale for the OCC’s decision
The OCC found authority to issue the preemption order from
12 U.S.C. § 371(a), which gives national banks the ability to “make,
arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens
on interests in real estate, subject to section 1828(o) of [the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act] and such restrictions and requirements as the
Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or
order.”56 The OCC interpreted this grant of power very broadly,
stating that “[i]n no respect does the statute express or imply that
the power granted is limited, to some variable degree, by application
of fifty different state laws.”57 Federal preemption principles and the
Supremacy Clause do not allow states to “modify a Congressional
grant of power to national banks by limiting, conditioning, or
otherwise impermissibly affecting a national bank’s exercise of that
power.”58
3. Scope of the OCC’s determination
Based on regulations that the OCC had already properly enacted
pursuant to § 371, the OCC reasoned further that various types of
state rules regulating national bank real estate lending do not apply
to national banks. Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) lists five areas of
53. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46265–66.
54. Id. at 46264.
55. See id.
56. 12 U.S.C. §371(a) (2000). The OCC’s order states that “[t]he Federal statute that
authorizes national banks’ real estate lending activities, 12 U.S.C. 371, precludes application of
many provisions of the GFLA to national banks.” GFLA Preemption Determination, supra
note 7, at 46266.
57. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276.
58. Id. at 46266.
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state laws and limitations that do not apply to national banks in the
area of mortgage lending, two of which covered GFLA provisions.59
First, under § 34.4(a)(2),60 GFLA restrictions on balloon payments,
negative amortization provisions, advance payment provisions, and
provisions against late fees, regulation of prepayment fees, and
provisions limiting default rates of interest were all preempted and
not applicable to national banks.61 Second, § 34.4(a)(3)62 expressly
preempted GFLA provisions governing limitations on prepayment
fees, prohibitions on the ability of a lender to accelerate the loan
absent default by the borrower, and provisions giving borrowers a
right to cure any default that occurred over the term of the loan.63
The OCC’s order also determined that additional GFLA
provisions were preempted under the broader preemption principle
stated in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b).64 Under this provision, the OCC
applied a traditional preemption analysis based upon the United
States Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.65 Because the
GFLA conditioned the exercise of § 371 “upon the approval of the
states,” provisions of the GFLA were preempted.66 The following

59. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2003); see also GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note
7, at 46276 (“Section 34.4(a) expressly preempts state laws concerning five areas of fixed-rate
mortgage lending . . . . Two of the five types of state laws expressly preempted by § 34.4(a)—
state laws concerning the schedule for the repayment of principal and interest (§ 34.4(a)(2))
and the term to maturity of the loan (§ 34.4(a)(3))—are relevant here.”).
60. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2) (providing that a state cannot regulate the “schedule for the
repayment to principal and interest”).
61. See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276.
62. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(3) (prohibiting states from regulating the “term to maturity of
the loan”).
63. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46276–77.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (proclaiming that “[t]he OCC will apply recognized principles
of Federal preemption in considering whether State laws apply to other aspects of real estate
lending by national banks”).
65. A federal law preempts state law (1) where Congress has expressly preempted state
law, Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1988); (2) where Congress
has occupied the field the state seeks to regulate, leaving no room for state legislation; or (3)
where state law “actually conflicts with federal law,” id.; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
A state law conflicts with federal law when (1) it is impossible to comply with both laws,
or (2) when the state law produces “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
66. In coming to this conclusion, the OCC relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34–35 (1996), which interpreted 12
U.S.C. § 92, a statute that gives national banks the power to act as agents for insurance sales.
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GFLA provisions impose requirements that a national bank must
satisfy before exercising lending powers granted to it by Congress
and are therefore preempted under the § 34.4(b) preemption
principle: the “financing of credit insurance and debt suspension and
debt cancellation fees,” “restrictions on refinancings,” the
requirement that borrowers receive counseling prior to receiving a
loan, restrictions on underwriting standards, limits on home
improvement loans, and certain notice requirements.67 Additional
provisions are preempted because they interfere with the power of
national banks to make real estate loans, including a provision
discouraging the use of mandatory arbitration, a provision imposing
liability on assignees of loans, a requirement that lenders not
encourage default by borrowers, and a requirement that contractors
be liable for the loans they produce.68
Finally, the OCC determined that some GFLA provisions are
preempted under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) and 12 C.F.R. §
7.1004.69 These sections preempt GFLA provisions prohibiting
payoff balance and release fees, provisions providing the borrower

See GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46277. The OCC reasoned that “as
recognized by the Supreme Court in Barnett, the history of national bank powers is one of
‘interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental “powers” to national banks as grants of
authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.’” Id.
at 46274 (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 32). “‘[W]here Congress has not expressly
conditioned the grant of ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily
found that no such condition applies.’” Id. at 46275 (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 34).
The OCC further explained that state laws do not normally apply when they alter or
condition a national bank’s ability to exercise a power that federal law grants to it. States are
allowed to regulate areas of contract, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property,
taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort law. These types of laws regulate the “legal infrastructure
that surrounds and supports the conduct of that business. They promote a national bank’s
ability to conduct business; they do not obstruct a national bank’s exercise of powers granted
under Federal law.” Id. at 46274–75. The GFLA, on the other hand, regulates the manner and
content of national bank’s lending activities, which is prohibited under § 371 and recognized
principles of federal preemption. Id.
67. GFLA Preemption Determination, supra note 7, at 46277.
68. Id. at 46278.
69. Id. at 46279. The preemption determination also noted that
section 24 (Seventh) authorizes a national bank to engage in activities
that are part of, or incidental to, the business of banking as well as to
engage in certain specified activities listed in the statute. A bank’s
authority to provide these services to its customers necessarily
encompasses the ability to charge a fee for them, and this ability to charge
a fee for the bank’s services is expressly affirmed in 12 CFR 7.4002(a).
Id.
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the right to cure default, and provisions limiting the rate of interest a
national bank can charge.70
B. The OTS Preemption Determinations
In an action similar to but preceding the OCC’s determination
that the GFLA does not apply to national banks or their operating
subsidiaries, the OTS also decided that the GFLA does not apply to
federally regulated savings and thrift associations.71 The OTS
followed a line of reasoning similar to that of the OCC, explaining
that, under the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”), Congress
required the OTS “to provide for the organization, incorporation,
examination, operation, and regulation of federal savings
associations.”72 Based on this language, the
OTS has made clear in its lending regulations its intent to carry out
this congressional objective by giving federal savings associations
maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance
with a uniform federal scheme of regulation. That uniform federal
scheme occupies the field of regulation for lending activities. The
comprehensiveness of the HOLA language demonstrates that
Congress intended the federal scheme to be exclusive, leaving no
room for state regulation, conflicting or complimentary.73

OTS regulations promulgated under HOLA give federal savings
associations the ability to make loans under federal law without
approval or interference from state laws or regulators.74 Thus,
“GFLA provisions purporting to regulate the terms of credit, loanrelated fees, disclosures, or the ability of a creditor to originate or
refinance a loan, are preempted by federal law from applying to
federal savings associations.”75
70. Id.
71. OTS GFLA Preemption Letter, supra note 9, at 1 (“We conclude that GFLA
provisions purporting to regulate the terms of credit, loan-related fees, disclosures, or the
ability of a creditor to originate or refinance a loan, are preempted by federal law from applying
to federal savings associations and their operating subsidies.”). As noted briefly above, the
OCC has regulatory power over federally chartered banking institutions while the OTS is
charged with regulating federally chartered savings and thrift associations. Thus, the OCC’s
preemption determination has application only to federally chartered banks, while the OTS’s
decision applies to federally chartered savings and thrift associations.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 2–3.
75. Id. at 2.
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Just a few months after the issuance of the letter preempting the
GFLA, the OTS issued a second preemption letter regarding New
Jersey’s abusive lending practices legislation, the New Jersey Home
Ownership Security Act.76 Following its reasoning in the GFLA
preemption order and using identical language, the OTS reaffirmed
its conclusion that it alone is authorized to impose conditions upon
federal savings associations’ lending activities.77
C. Why Exclusive Federal Regulation of Predatory
Lending Is Insufficient
Because of the broad preemptive scope of these OCC and OTS
determinations, it is unlikely that state restrictions on predatory
practices will ever be effective against federal savings and thrift
associations, thus underscoring the importance of finding ways to
regulate such practices without interfering with the powers of the
OCC and OTS to regulate in this area. In addition to these
preemption determinations, the OCC has also recently released a
proposed rule that may allow it to completely preempt the field of
regulation of national bank real estate lending, therefore making it
impossible for states to take any kind of action against national banks
operating within their borders.78 While it is true that the OCC and
OTS preemption determinations do not serve to remove the enacted
statutes from the states’ books, they do substantially limit the ability
of states to effectively legislate against abusive lending practices in
two ways.
First, the GFLA contains a parity provision that serves to place
state-chartered banks on the same level as federally chartered banks
with regard to regulatory strictures.79 If the GFLA provisions are
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN § 46.10B-22 (West 2002); OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter,
supra note 9.
77. OTS NJHOSA Preemption Letter, supra note 9, at 4–5.
78. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg.
46119 (proposed Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) (proposing to
amend C.F.R. parts 7 and 34 “to add provisions clarifying the applicability of state law to
national banks[,] provisions [which] would identify types of state laws that are preempted, as
well as types of state laws that generally are not preempted, in the context of national bank
lending, deposit-taking, and other authorized activities”).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-12 (2002) (stating that the provisions of the GFLA will not
apply to state-chartered financial institutions to the “extent federal law precludes or preempts
or has been determined to preclude or preempt the application of the provisions of this chapter
to any federally chartered bank”).
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preempted on a federal level so that they no longer apply to
nationally chartered banks, those provisions also do not apply to
state institutions, which nullifies the law’s effect against state lenders
as well as national lenders.80 The Georgia Attorney General has
issued an opinion that the parity provision has taken effect as a result
of the OCC’s decision; the GFLA, therefore, no longer applies to
state banks or federal banks, which leaves regulation of abusive
lending practices unchanged from the way they were prior to
GFLA’s enactment.81 Similar results may follow for states that enact
predatory lending statutes with parity provisions that resemble the
one contained in the GFLA.
Second, even in situations where state predatory lending laws do
not contain parity provisions like Georgia’s, and the law remains in
effect against state banks, OCC preemption means that state
regulation cannot reach nationally chartered financial institutions.
OCC preemption and its recent proposed rulemaking, mentioned
above, which could potentially allow the OCC to occupy the field of
national bank real estate lending and totally preempt the states from
regulating national bank real estate lending, it is becoming
increasingly unlikely that federally chartered financial institutions will
be subject to state predatory lending measures in the future.82 As the
problem of predatory lending continues, and federal agencies show a
willingness to preempt state regulations that affect nationally
chartered financial institutions, states that have enacted legislation
similar to Georgia’s are left with fewer options for protecting at-risk
consumers in the subprime market.
Furthermore, increased regulation of predatory lending practices
on the federal level will not adequately protect consumers. Although
it is possible that federal regulatory agencies and Congress could
enact additional legislation that applies to nationally chartered
lending institutions and heighten existing standards under federal
laws such as HOEPA, TILA, and RESPA,83 significant changes to
the federal regulatory structure that address predatory lending
80. See generally Memorandum from Bo Fears, supra note 13.
81. See id. (explaining that the OCC’s preemption order is a preemption determination
within the meaning of the GFLA’s parity provision, which, according to that provision, leads
to the conclusion that the GFLA does not apply to state banks).
82. See Bank Activities and Operations, supra note 78.
83. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 53–54 (outlining HOEPA’s,
TILA’s, and RESPA’s provisions).

719

CHI-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/16/2004 5:13 PM

[Summer 2004

practices have not yet been put in place. As noted by the
Departments of Treasury and HUD throughout their report on the
topic, the federal scheme for regulating predatory practices contains
gaps and could be adjusted significantly to provide adequate
protection.84 States enacted their laws, at least in part, to fill the
federal gaps, and to date the federal government has made no
significant changes to address the predatory lending problem.
Even if the federal scheme is changed significantly, the problem
is complicated by the fact that many federal regulations would not
apply to state banks. The American dual banking system gives the
authority to regulate a bank to the government that chartered it. 85
Although many of the federal laws apply to state and federal banks
alike (such as HOEPA, TILA, and RESPA), the “day-to-day”
oversight of state-chartered banks is performed by state regulatory
agencies, while federal banks and other financial institutions are
regulated solely by the OCC and the OTS. 86 If Congress fails to
enact additional protections or amend existing laws that are
applicable to both state and federal banks, and if states do not find
solutions to the predatory problem that are effective against both
state and federal lenders, such as those suggested in Part IV,
predatory practices may remain largely unregulated.
However, additional action by Congress in this area may not be
desirable and, at any rate, would not be a panacea. A blanket federal
solution is not adequate or necessary to solve the problem; each
jurisdiction requires a distinct response that is tailored to fit the
situation. The Treasury-HUD Joint Report notes that “the exact
nature of abusive lending practices often varies from community to
community,” and concludes that “[s]tate regulators and
enforcement agencies . . . may be best equipped to understand the
roots of the problems that exist within their own borders.”87 For
instance, empirical evidence suggests that the predatory lending
problem in urban areas with large minority communities is different
than the problem that exists in areas where such communities do not

84. Id. at 69–71, 75, 77, 82, 84–88 (recommending that changes be made to HOEPA,
TILA, and RESPA to better combat predatory lending abuses).
85. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988).
86. Id.
87. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 83.
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exist.88 The predatory lending problem in urban, minority
communities results from the higher rate of subprime lending that
occurs in those areas.89 By contrast, the problem in Utah, for
example, is much different. Although many borrowers in Utah are
being saddled with loans they cannot handle—a common practice
among predatory lenders—the fraud in that jurisdiction often
includes participation by the borrowers themselves, who assist
mortgage brokers in the inflation of incomes and other such
practices in order to be approved for a home they could not
otherwise afford.90 Problems faced in various jurisdictions require a
distinct regulatory response.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR STATES IN THE FACE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Because federal regulatory agencies are prone to preempt state
efforts, because federal regulation is incomplete, and because blanket
federal regulation will not fully address the problem, it is important
that states develop solutions that are effective in stopping predatory
lending abuses, that do not interfere with federal financial
institutions’ lending powers, and that do not restrict regulations
promulgated by federal regulatory agencies pursuant to their
perceived regulatory powers. This Part provides two suggestions for
states to curb predatory lending abuses in spite of these obstacles:
the regulation of mortgage loan sellers and increased prosecution
through state unfair and deceptive trade practices acts. Although
other solutions to the predatory lending problem exist, these
suggestions effectively address the problem and cannot be preempted
by federal regulatory agencies.
88. See supra Part II.B.
89. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN CHICAGO: INCOME
AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING 3, 5 (2000) (finding a higher rate of
subprime loans being made in certain minority communities than in white communities of
Chicago and suggesting that these higher rates may lead to an increase in predatory lending
abuses such as “excessive mortgage fees, interest rates, penalties and insurance charges that
raise the cost of refinancing by thousands of dollars for individual families”). For other regional
analyses making similar conclusions, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL
BURDEN IN ATLANTA: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000);
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN BALTIMORE: INCOME AND
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
UNEQUAL BURDEN IN LOS ANGELES: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME
LENDING (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN NEW YORK:
INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000).
90. Lesley Mitchell, Home Loan Fraud Soaring, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 23, 2003, at E1.
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A. Increased Regulation of Nonbank Loan Sales
As explained in Part II, the problem of predatory lending arises
primarily because of unscrupulous, deceptive, and fraudulent sales
tactics. Sellers of loans, just like any salesperson, have obvious
incentives to sell loans—namely, they stand to profit. Because of this,
unregulated nonbank sellers of loans—primarily mortgage brokers—
are a significant part of the predatory lending problem. Inadequate
or nonexistent regulation, pricing structures that give mortgage
brokers incentives to sell loans that may not be appropriate for
particular borrowers, and the facts that brokers do not actually back
the loan financially and do not take on the credit risk themselves,
create a significant risk that some mortgage brokers will be tempted
to engage in predatory lending practices. States can remedy this
problem, at least partly, by increasing mortgage broker licensing and
registration requirements and by providing better oversight and
additional guidance through a regulatory agency.
1. Nonbank loan sellers are the main source of the predatory lending
problem
Mortgage brokers—nonbank loan sellers—facilitate as many as
two-thirds of all home loans91 and originate fifty percent of subprime
loans.92 “[T]he growth of this industry has brought with it increasing
complaints of mortgage fraud and predatory lending.”93 Although
brokers process and originate most home loans, regulation of
brokers, which is done at the state level, is uneven or nonexistent in
some cases. A group of state attorneys general, writing as amicus
curiae in a recent case regarding an OTS rulemaking, claimed that
[b]ased on consumer complaints received, as well as investigations
and enforcement actions undertaken by the Attorneys General,
predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime
mortgage lending market and to nondepository institutions.

91. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7 (“Brokers today touch about 2/3 or more of all
home loans.”).
92. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 39–40 (“According to the
National Association of Mortgage Brokers, mortgage brokers arrange financing for well over
half of all home mortgages today. The National Home Equity Mortgage Association also
reports that about 50 percent of subprime loans are originated through mortgage brokers.”).
93. V. Lynne Windham, Alabama’s New Mortgage Brokers Licensing Act, 64 ALA. LAW.
52, 53 (2003).
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Almost all of the leading subprime lenders are mortgage companies
and finance companies, not banks or direct bank subsidiaries.94

Not only do mortgage brokers facilitate most home mortgage
loans and most subprime loans, the role of a mortgage broker in a
loan transaction is extensive, giving unscrupulous mortgage brokers
ample opportunity to engage in predatory practices. Mortgage
brokers provide a service to those seeking a home loan by counseling
with them, helping them select and qualify for a loan, shopping for
the best rate among various lenders, and locking in the terms of the
loan with the lender.95 Mortgage brokers also provide federally
mandated disclosures, gather all documentation necessary to get the
loan through the lender’s underwriting process, order property
appraisals and borrower credit reports, verify the borrower’s source
of income, facilitate the loan closing, and see the loan through until
it is later given over completely to the lender.96 The broker usually
provides all the necessary services required to generate the loan, with
the exception of providing the loan funds.97 Typically, once the loan
is closed and the broker is paid, his relationship with the borrower
ceases and the lender is involved exclusively with servicing the
borrower’s loan.98
Because of their extensive involvement in the lending process
and the relationship of trust and counseling they often have with
their clients, mortgage brokers are also in a unique position that may
allow them to take advantage of unwary borrowers. Brokers

94. OCC Preemption Determination and Order Concerning the Georgia Fair Lending
Act, Questions and Answers, July 31, 2003, at 1–2 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae State
Attorneys General, Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, Civil Action No. 02-2506
(GK) (D.D.C. 2003) (regarding predatory lending filed in a litigation concerning an OTS
rulemaking)). Also,
predatory lending generally does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it breeds
in an environment characterized by little competition for traditional
financial services. Specifically, a community flush with ‘fringe lenders’—
check cashing outlets, pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, title lenders, and
similar operations—as well as excessive subprime lending, is the
environment in which predatory lending activities often flourish.
Carr & Kolluri, supra note 35, at 32.
95. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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may hide disclosures from borrowers, begin work on a borrower’s
home and then “bait and switch” with new loan terms before the
loan is closed, finance fees without borrowers’ knowledge, or lead
them to believe that they must purchase products such as credit
insurance in order to close the loan.99

Many third party brokers engage in “aggressive marketing and
solicitation tactics” that sometimes “rise to the level of fraud or
illegal deception.”100
Mortgage brokers engage in such practices because of the real
potential for financial gain. The broker compensation system is such
that “brokers are paid by borrowers and in many cases, by lenders . . . .
The total from both sources is their gross profit from a
transaction.”101 While the amount of the borrower-paid portion of
the fee is typically ascertainable before or at the closing of the loan,
the amount the lender pays to the broker is often paid in the form of
a confusing and nontransparent “yield-spread premium,” which, in
the end, comes out of the borrower’s pocket as well. A yield-spread
premium—a fee kicked back from the lender to the broker— “is
inflated interest on a loan that is used to cover the cost of the
broker’s fee.”102 One study of such premiums determined that, in the
prime market,
[brokers] added an average cost of over $1,100 on each transaction
in which they were charged. The author found that the most likely
explanation for the added cost was not added value, nor added
services. Rather, it is a system which lends itself to price
discrimination: extra broker-compensation can be extracted from
less sophisticated consumers, while it can be waived for the few
who are savvy about the complex pricing practices in today’s
mortgage market.103

99. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
100. Id. at 79.
101. GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 7.
102. Anna Beth Ferguson, Note, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack of
Adequate Protection for Ohio Consumers, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (“For
example, a borrower may qualify for a loan at a 10% annual percentage rate . . . . The broker
negotiates the loan at a higher rate of 10.25% and then splits the interest premium with the
lender.”).
103. Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 n.17 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney
General, State of Iowa).
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Because of the potential of collecting yield-spread premiums from
unwary borrowers, some mortgage brokers seek out lenders that
serve their own interests by offering the broker the best
compensation package rather than looking out for their client’s best
interests.104
Even when yield-spread premiums are not involved, broker
compensation is based upon the amount of the loan. In order to
increase fees and commissions, “brokers have an incentive to
encourage the borrowers to take out as large a loan as possible.”105
“The use of brokers has hastened the growth of subprime lending,
given that brokers have placed some borrowers who would otherwise
qualify for conventional loans into subprime loans because of the
greater broker fees from subprime loans.”106 These compensation
features cause divided loyalties, since the broker should be looking
out for the interests of her client. “As with most other transactions in
our increasingly complex society, these borrowers rely on the good
faith and honesty of the ‘specialist’ to help provide full, accurate, and
complete information and explanations. Unfortunately, much
predatory lending is a function of misplaced trust.”107 Although
mortgage brokers act in many ways as agents for their clients and
stand in relationships of trust with them, the compensation system
can lead to unfavorable results for borrowers.108

104. Eggert, supra note 24, at 553 (2002) (noting that the “use of brokers may lead to
higher fees charged to borrowers, as brokers could be tempted to seek out the lenders that
provide the greatest payments to brokers rather than the best rates to borrowers”).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 553–54. One source notes that
A 5 percent fee from a borrower who needs—and wants—just $5000 for a roof
repair is only $250. But if the broker turns that into a refinance loan, of $40,000,
further padded with another $10,000 of financed points, fees, and insurance
premiums, his 5 percent, now $2,500, looks a lot better.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 57–58 (2001) (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General,
State of Iowa).
107. Hearings, supra note 1, at 57–58 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General,
State of Iowa).
108. Guttentag describes the relationship between a mortgage broker and her client and
the problems that can arise from that relationship as follows:
Mortgage brokers can shop lenders much more effectively than consumers, because
this is what they do. They are in the market every day. Knowledge of market niches
is part of their stock in trade. They have relationships with multiple lenders, and are
therefore positioned to find and shop among the lenders offering particular features.
And they know the lenders who take 10 days to underwrite a loan and those who
take one day.
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In addition to these structural problems, it is often the case that,
unlike banks and other savings institutions that originate mortgage
loans, mortgage brokers are not subject to regulation by state or
federal agencies.109 Regulation of mortgage brokers, which occurs on
the state level, is often uneven or nonexistent.110 Often, even if
brokers must be licensed, they are not regulated.111 As of June 2000,
although thirty-nine states had some mortgage broker registration
requirement and twenty-nine required proof of net worth, only six
states required mortgage brokers to pass a competency test.112
Brokers are often undercapitalized and sometimes simply move from
state to state after declaring bankruptcy or otherwise facing
consequences for making abusive loans.113
Furthermore, the mere fact that a broker is licensed does not
mean that sellers of unfair loans are caught, prosecuted, or held
accountable for engaging in deceptive and unfair sales tactics. In
most states, the licensing and enforcement divisions are ineffective
when it comes to stopping predatory sales tactics employed by
mortgage brokers. As noted in the Treasury-HUD Joint Report,
[t]he subprime mortgage and finance companies that dominate
mortgage lending in many low-income and minority communities,
while subject to the same consumer protection laws, are not subject
to as much federal oversight as their prime market counterparts—
who are largely federally-supervised banks, thrifts, and credit
unions. The absence of such accountability may create an
Lenders know that brokers are careful and knowledgeable shoppers while most
consumers are not. That’s why price differences between lenders are smaller in the
wholesale market than in the retail market.
But mortgage brokers now shop for themselves. Acting as independent
contractors, they have been a major part of the problem.
The key to effective reform of the home loan market is to mandate that
mortgage brokers act as agents of borrowers, and that the fees for their services be
explicit.
GUTTENTAG, supra note 21, at 24–25.
109. Eggert, supra note 24, at 554 (“Even in the majority of states that regulate
mortgage brokers, the scope and intensiveness of that regulation is often modest compared to
that directed at other lending institutions.”).
110. Id. (“The amount of regulation of mortgage brokers varies dramatically by state . . . .
Some states have virtually no regulation.”).
111. TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
112. See id. at 79, Table 6.1.
113. See id. at 81 (citing evidence of “thinly capitalized brokers, contractors and lenders
who abused consumers, declared bankruptcy, moved to new states and began operating there
under different names”).
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environment where predatory practices flourish because they are
unlikely to be detected.114

2. What form should state regulation of mortgage brokers take?
The inadequacy of state regulation of mortgage brokers and
other loan sellers demonstrates that state policymakers should take
thoughtful measures to combat predatory practices. This section
suggests some practical solutions that states should consider when
enacting regulation targeted at predatory mortgage brokers and
other predatory loan sellers.115 States can decrease the rate of abusive
lending occurrences among loan brokers by heightening licensing
and registration standards for mortgage brokers (including increasing
loan officer/originator fitness and competency requirements,
requiring proof of adequate capitalization, and increasing or
implementing bonding and insurance requirements) and by creating
an agency that outlines prohibited acts and contract provisions and
enforces violations of such guidelines.116

114. Id. at 18. As demonstrated in this section, mortgage brokers and other nonbank
loan originators have the opportunity and motive to commit predatory lending abuses. They
are also not subject to extensive oversight, which makes it unlikely that such abuses, when they
occur, will be detected or stopped. However, it is true that mortgage brokers are not the only
source of the predatory lending problem and that there is no way to prove or determine exactly
what percentage of predatory lending mortgage brokers account for. Rather than suggesting
that all predatory lending is promulgated by mortgage brokers (which suggestion would be
untrue and unfair to legitimate mortgage brokers), this Comment merely attempts to show
that it is highly likely that a significant number of predatory lending abuses come from the
subprime mortgage broker market and that better regulation of mortgage broker sales practices
will, therefore, help reduce the occurrence of such lending abuses. As explained, a vast number
of mortgages go through the hands of unregulated mortgage brokers, many of whom may
have powerful incentives to engage in lending abuses.
115. Each state should carefully analyze the breadth and depth of the abusive lending
problem faced by consumers in their state and develop a solution that is tailored to address the
problem.
116. Because every form of regulation imposes costs upon the regulator and upon the
actors subject to it, the costs and benefits of any action must be weighed. Actions taken to
regulate mortgage brokers should be clearly directed at the problem and impose as few costs
upon brokers as possible. As stated in the HUD-Treasury report, “[i]mposing additional
regulations on brokers, contractors and appraisers will impose costs on all of these parties, not
just those who engage in abusive practices. New regulations should seek to protect vulnerable
consumers, while not imposing undue compliance burdens on honest market participants.”
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 81. Also, although it is true that many states
have laws in place, aimed at regulating mortgage brokers, that accomplish one or more of the
tasks suggested in this part, most states can work to regulate mortgage broker activity more
efficiently and in a way that better protects consumers.
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a. Licensing and registration of mortgage brokers. Although several
states require that mortgage brokers and other loan sellers obtain a
license or register with the state before originating loans, many do
not.117 Aware of this problem in his state, the President of the Illinois
Mortgage Bankers Association commented, “It’s too easy to get into
this business. . . . It’s not good that you could be selling paint at
Sears one week and originating loans the next.”118 Because of the
importance of this issue, and the substantial investment borrowers
make when purchasing a home, it is imperative that “[r]esidential
mortgage loan originators who work directly with the public . . . be
educated, honest, and professional.”119 Laws must seek to ensure
moral and professional competence among those applying to become
mortgage brokers. To be effective, licensing laws should require that
every mortgage seller be individually licensed and registered.120 States
should conduct background investigations to test the ethical fitness
of loan originators.121 Licenses should not be issued to loan officers
117. GOODWIN PROCTER, LLP, STATE LAWS PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ABUSIVE
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES 24 (2001), available at http://www.mbaa.org/
industry/reports/01/goodwin_0720.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) (noting that only ten
states require loan officers to be licensed or registered with the state, including California,
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin).
Alabama also enacted mortgage broker licensing legislation in 2001. ALA. CODE § 5-25-1 et
seq. (2002).
118. Loan Battle Brews Anew: Subprime Lenders, Activists Set to Spar Again in Springfield,
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Dec. 11, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 8130226 (quoting Ben Israel,
president of the Illinois Mortgage Bankers Association).
119. NAT’L ASS’N OF MORTGAGE BROKERS, MODEL STATE STATUTE INITIATIVE:
LICENSING, PRE-LICENSURE EDUCATION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR ALL
ORIGINATORS 6 (2002) [hereinafter NAMB INITIATIVE]. The National Association of
Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) noted the importance of licensing and education requirements and
cited such as a goal behind its recent Model State Statute Initiative on the topic. Id. (“NAMB
firmly believes that part of the solution to consumer abuse and predatory lending is mandatory
licensing and education of all residential loan originators.”). The initiative is designed to “help
reduce the incidence of predatory lending and improve the overall competency of the
industry.” Id.
120. See id. at 5.
121. See id. at 7 (suggesting that all applicants for a mortgage broker license “submit to a
background investigation of, at a minimum, criminal records, and employment history”).
Alabama requires that applicants for a mortgage broker license submit six letters of reference
concerning the applicant’s experience and reputation. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(c)(3)–(4) (2002).
The Alabama law requires that the state conduct a background investigation and that the state
“may not license any applicant unless it is satisfied that the applicant may be expected to
operate its mortgage brokerage activities in compliance with the laws of this state.” Id. § 5-256(b).

AND
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who have been convicted of a felony or crimes involving fraud, who
have been involved in unethical activities, or who have had a financial
services license revoked due to past unethical conduct.122 Loan
officers should be required to pass competency tests that require
them to demonstrate the capacity to effectively counsel consumers,123
that test understanding of principles of mortgage ethics and
mortgage law, and that otherwise require them to demonstrate
familiarity with industry standards and rules.124 These fitness and
competency requirements should be imposed upon the principals of
mortgage companies as well as upon loan officers working for such
companies.125
In addition to increasing licensing requirements and requiring
competency tests, mortgage companies should be required to show
that they are financially sound.126 Mortgage companies should be

122. In Nevada, the licensing authority can refuse to issue a license to any mortgage
company that employs individuals who have been “convicted of, or entered a plea of nolo
contendere to” any “felony relating to the practice of mortgage agents,” any “crime involving
fraud, misrepresentation or moral turpitude,” or anyone who “[h]ad a financial services license
or registration suspended or revoked within the immediately preceding 10 years.” NEV. REV.
STAT. § 645B.0243 (2002). Violations of Nevada’s mortgage broker licensing law can result in
suspension or revocation of a license as well as fines of up to $10,000 per violation. Id. §
645B.670.
Alabama will not issue a mortgage broker license to any applicant with a principal officer
who has been convicted of a felony or any crime involving breach of trust, fraud, or dishonesty.
ALA. CODE §5-25-6(c).
123. NAMB INITIATIVE, supra note 119, at 9. Nevada law facilitates similar objectives by
placing the burden upon lenders to ensure that loan officers and mortgage sellers working for
them comply with the law and otherwise understand principles of ethical and sound lending
practices. NEV. REV. STAT. § 645B.460.
124. As one commentator notes,
A person who has studied the subject and the law should be able to
competently interact with the public and cannot justifiably claim
ignorance of permitted and prohibited practices. Testing industry
participants also raises the perceived level of professionalism associated
with the undertaking, which puts mortgage lenders and brokers more on
a par with securities brokers, real estate brokers and others involved in
offering complex financial products to the public.
GOODWIN PROCTER, supra note 117, at 27.
125. “[E]stablishing minimum educational requirements as well as requiring continuing
education will substantially increase each Residential Loan Originator’s awareness of their [sic]
responsibility and duty to give consumers fair and honest service.” NAMB INITIATIVE, supra
note 119, at 10.
126. See TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 81 (noting evidence of “thinly
capitalized brokers, contractors and lenders who abused consumers, declared bankruptcy,
moved to new states and began operating there under different names”).
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required to provide proof of adequate capitalization and should meet
minimum bonding and insurance requirements.127 Without such
requirements,
[a] mortgage broker could easily be judgment-proof in the states
that do not require them to be bonded or to maintain a minimum
capital. Such mortgage brokers are free to disappear if they are
sued. Disreputable brokers have been known to declare
bankruptcy, move to another state, and begin business anew under
assumed names.128

These financial fundamentals would better protect consumers
and ensure that consumers have something against which they can
recover in the event of a lending abuse in which they are damaged.
b. Set forth prohibited acts and contract provisions and enforce
violations. Mortgage lenders should be subject to the supervision of a
state regulatory agency that has the power to provide guidelines and
enforce them. State enforcement agencies should have power to
perform occasional audits to ensure that individual loan sellers and
mortgage companies are complying with state and federal laws and
regulations.129 An enforcement agency should have the power to set
forth ethical standards, require licensees to obtain continuing
education regarding industry standards, and alert them to developing
problems in the industry.130 Mortgage broker licensing statutes
should allow the agency to revoke individual licenses for violations of
standards in addition to licenses issued to mortgage companies, thus
removing predatory lenders from the market.131 Penalties for

127. The Alabama Mortgage Brokers Licensing Act requires that applicants for a
mortgage license have a minimum capital net worth of $25,000. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(c)(2)
(2002).
128. Eggert, supra note 24, at 556.
129. The Alabama Act gives enforcement of the Act to the Supervisor of the Bureau of
Loans (part of the State Banking Department). ALA. CODE § 5-25-16. Mortgage broker
licensees are subject to investigations by examination of their business records. Id. § 5-25-9(b).
130. The NAMB Initiative suggests that “[e]very residential mortgage originator,
whether a Residential Loan Officer or Principal Mortgage Owner, shall, upon renewal of an
existing license, submit proof of satisfactory completion of a course of study.” NAMB
INITIATIVE, supra note 119, at 9. Alabama’s Act requires mortgage broker licensees to obtain
twelve hours of continuing education. ALA. CODE § 5-25-5(b)(6).
131. Violations of the Alabama Act may subject a licensee to suspension or revocation of
his mortgage broker license, ALA. CODE § 5-25-14(a), the assessment of civil penalties, id. § 525-16(b), and could subject him to criminal penalties, id. §5-25-17.
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violations and predatory practices would include fines and increased
supervision, as well as prohibitions on collecting fees or requirements
that fees obtained through predatory transactions be refunded.
B. Increased Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts
In addition to improving regulation of mortgage brokers and
other loan sellers at the state level, states can combat predatory
lending practices through increased enforcement of existing
deceptive and unfair trade practices acts. Many states have enacted
legislation, modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC
Act”), aimed at stopping deceptive and unfair trade practices.132
These state acts generally protect consumers against a broad range of
undesirable, deceptive, and coercive practices.133 In many states,
violations can only be prosecuted by state agencies, while others
expressly provide private rights of action for violations.134
State attorneys general have used state deceptive trade practices
acts to combat predatory practices.135 In the most notable instance,
several states have used their acts against First Alliance Mortgage
Company (“FAMCO”), whose

132. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.0903–598.0999; ch. 598A (2002); see also 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
133. For example, Nevada Revised Statutes sections 598.0915–598.0925 list practices
that are defined as deceptive. Specifically, section 598.0915(15) states that a person who
“[k]nowingly makes any . . . false representation in a transaction” engages in a deceptive trade
practice, subjecting him to liability under the act. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915(15). This
language could reasonably be interpreted to include representations made in lending
transactions.
134. For example, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington all
provide some sort of private right of action under consumer protection statutes addressing
unfair and deceptive trade practices. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-2, 480-13 (2002); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 205-A (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638 (2001); 73 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2003); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West 2003); Bodin v. B. & L. Furniture Co., 601 P.2d
848 (Or. Ct. App. 1979). Florida allows anyone to seek injunctive relief under its Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but only allows consumers, and not competitors, to seek money
damages. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (West 2003); Big Tomato v. Tasty Concepts, Inc.,
972 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Minnesota allows for injunctive relief under its Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, but no private damages actions are allowed. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
325D.45 (West 2003); Mayo Clinic v. Mayo’s Drug and Cosmetic, Inc., 113 N.W.2d 852
(Minn. 1962); Simmons v. Modern Aero, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
135. Hearings, supra note 1, at 53 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General,
State of Iowa).
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employees were rigorously trained as to how to disguise their 20point charges through a sales script full of tricky and misleading
information designed to mislead consumers into thinking that the
charges were much lower than they were. This sales script was
dubbed “The Monster Track.” Attorneys General in Minnesota,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Florida, California, New York, and Arizona
have taken action against the company, along with the Department
of Financial Institutions in Washington State. (In the wake of all
the litigation and enforcement actions, the company filed
bankruptcy.)136

Other jurisdictions have also allowed deceptive trade practices acts to
be used against lenders for various actions that were considered
deceptive or unfair under their states’ respective acts.137
Following the lead of the attorneys general in the FAMCO case
and others, state regulators and prosecutors can bring actions under
state trade practice laws in order to combat predatory practices
employed by all types of lending interests, including mortgage
brokers and federally and state-chartered banks. State deceptive and
unfair trade practices acts can be enforced against national and state
banks alike, regardless of the scope of the OCC’s proposed
136. Id. at 61.
137. See In re Russell, 72 B.R. 855, 870–72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection law to the conduct of a
commercial lender); Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 15 (Haw. 2000)
(holding that claims regarding the interest rate of a loan made by a credit union fell within the
ambit of the Hawaii unfair practices act and could be brought under that act); People v. N. Ill.
Mortgage Co., 559 N.E.2d 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing order for summary judgment in
favor of a mortgage company that was sued by the state for conduct amounting to a pattern of
unfair or deceptive acts under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Uniform Deceptive Practices
Acts); Baird v. Norwest Bank, 843 P.2d 327, 334 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the Montana
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law applies to the conduct of a commercial
lender); Chavers v. Fleet Bank, No. PC 00-5237, 2001 WL 506776, at *8 (R.I. Super. Apr.
20, 2001) (upholding an action under the Rhode Island Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act by a consumer against Fleet Bank, a federally chartered bank, for employing “bait and
switch” tactics in soliciting credit card accounts); Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas, 999
S.W.2d 846, 851–52 (Tex. App. 1999) (upholding a judgment under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act against lender for deceptive acts in connection with home loan financing);
Wieler v. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex., 887 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that
“unconscionable acts in connection with a foreclosure can support recovery” under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Forth Worth Mortgage Corp. v. Abercrombie, 835 S.W.2d
262, 266 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that a lender’s act of canceling a borrower’s mortgage
protection policy and substituting it for one with less benefits was deceptive and subjected it to
liability under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Investors, Inc. v. Hadley, 738 S.W.2d
737 (Tex. App. 1987) (allowing an action against a lender under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act).
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rulemaking or any other preemptive action federal regulatory
agencies take.138 As explained in Part III.A, the OCC reasoned in its

138. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that the Connecticut Uniform Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA) is applicable to banks in Normand Josef Enterprises v. Connecticut
National Bank, 646 A.2d 1289, 1306 (Conn. 1994). In that case, Connecticut National Bank
argued that CUTPA did not apply to it because the statute was similar to the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which exempts banks from enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission of
the FTC Act. Id. at 1300–01. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, however, reasoned that the
fact of bank exemption “from the Federal Trade Commission Act does not establish their
exemption from CUTPA.” Id. at 1301. The court further reasoned that
[w]hile banks are arguably comprehensively regulated under federal law, even
national banks, which are instrumentalities of the federal government, have always
been subject to the laws of the state in which they do business. State laws are
preempted only when their operation expressly conflicts with the laws of the United
States.
Id. at 1304–05. Finally, the court explained that “[t]he mere existence of generic state and
federal banking regulations does not exclude CUTPA coverage. CUTPA is applicable even
when its regulatory scheme overlaps that authorized by another statute or regulation.” Id. at
1305. Thus, the CUTPA was applicable against banks and can be enforced against banks in
spite of the general scheme of federal regulation of banks.
The court in Normand Josef Enterprises cited a long list of cases from other jurisdictions
that have likewise held that their state’s deceptive and unfair trade practices or consumer
protection statutes are applicable to banks, including cases from California, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, and Washington. See, e.g., Heastie v. Cmty.
Bank of Greater Peoria, 727 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying an Illinois
consumer fraud statute); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 514 (Cal. 1985);
Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 56–57 (Cal. 1979); First Nat’l Bank of Anthony
v. Dunning, 855 P.2d 493, 498 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Raymer v. Bay State Nat’l Bank, 424
N.E.2d 515, 521 (Mass. 1981); Attorney Gen. v. Mich. Nat’l Bank, 312 N.W.2d 405, 414
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), rev’d in part, 325 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1982); Baird v. Norwest Bank,
843 P.2d 327, 333–34 (Mont. 1992); Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, 753 P.2d 346,
348 (N.M. 1988); Pa. Bankers Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 427 A.2d 730, 732–33 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1981). Normand Josef Enterprises also cited the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in
Vogt v. Seattle-First National Bank, which noted that
Although the Comptroller of the Currency has regulatory and supervisory authority
over national banks, that authority alone does not result in exemption under the
Consumer Protection Act for Seafirst in this case. Its conduct as trustee is not
preempted by federal regulation and thus is subject to the Consumer Protection
Act.
817 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wash. 1991).
Since the decision in Norman Josef Enterprises, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”) has determined that although the Federal Trade Commission has no
power to enforce the FTC Act against national banks, it does have the authority to do so. See
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, OCC Advisory Letter AL 2002-3 (Mar.
22, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc. However, the
mere fact that the OCC has decided to enforce violations of the act in this area does not mean
that state acts are preempted and that states no longer have the ability to enforce their
deceptive trade practices acts against the state banks. As noted by the Connecticut Supreme
Court, banks are still subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they do business. The
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order preempting the GFLA that the OCC had been given broad
powers to regulate federally chartered banks’ real estate lending
powers under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a).139 National bank powers are
limited to those given them explicitly by Congress, and Congress has
not given them the power to engage in acts and practices that violate
the FTC Act or are otherwise fraudulent.140 Enforcement by states of
substantively similar state statutes does not interfere with any
properly-given national bank real estate lending power and therefore
cannot be stopped through federal preemption.141
The fact that state deceptive trade practice laws may not be
identical to the FTC Act also should not hinder states’ ability to
prosecute violations without interference from federal regulators.
Although state deceptive trade practice acts are often not identical to
the FTC Act, they are, in most cases, substantively the same; where

enforcement by states of substantively similar provisions where states follow the guidance
provided by the FTC and OCC in their advisory letters cannot be said to conflict with any law
or purpose of the United States and therefore should not be preempted. Rather than
conflicting with federal law, such continued enforcement by states complements the federal
scheme.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). Section 371(a) gives national banks the ability to
“make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in
real estate, subject to section 1828(o) of [the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] and such
restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation
or order.” Id.
140. It is true that enforcing state deceptive trade practices laws may affect the “manner
or content” of national bank real estate lending, at least indirectly—the OCC indicated in its
GFLA preemption order that such laws are preempted. However, the fact remains that
Congress has not given national banks the power to engage in illegal or deceptive lending
practices. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000) (listing national bank powers); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934) (“The measure of [national bank] powers is the statutory
grant; and powers not conferred by Congress are denied. For the act under which national
banks are organized constitutes a complete system for their government.”) (citations omitted).
Instituting enforcement actions to stop such practices does not interfere with any lawful or
proper power given to national banks under federal law.
141. The Treasury-HUD Joint Report recognized the value of enforcement through state
deceptive trade practices acts:
Through the regional Task Force forums, HUD and Treasury learned that the exact
nature of abusive lending practices often varies from community to community.
State regulators and enforcement agencies should give increased focus to the
growing problem of fraudulent, unfair and deceptive practices in the mortgage
lending market, as they may be best equipped to understand the roots of the
problems that exist within their own borders.
TREASURY-HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 2, at 83.
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they are not, they can be amended to mirror the FTC Act.142 States
can enforce deceptive trade practice acts for lending violations as is
done in other contexts in which states enforce federal lending law.
For example, Connecticut has restated and adopted TILA “almost
verbatim,” and Arizona has made it a state law violation to infringe
upon the terms of “RESPA or the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
which includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ECOA, and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as TILA.”143 West Virginia
makes any violation of a “federal law regulating mortgage loan
transactions” a violation of West Virginia law.144 Similar action can
be taken in those states where mini-FTC Acts have not been adopted
or in instances where amendments are necessary to bring state unfair
trade practices laws in line with federal laws.
Because state acts are usually substantively similar and typically
contain much of the same language as the FTC Act, states can use
federal guidance in determining what sorts of deceptive and
predatory lending practices can be combated under state unfair trade
practices acts. In particular, states should follow OCC guidance in
determining what is unfair and deceptive and should therefore
subject mortgage sellers to prosecution under state deceptive trade
practices acts. In a recent letter, the OCC reasoned that certain
deceptive loan practices, including loan flipping and equity stripping,
are deceptive and unfair under the FTC Act and will be prosecuted
under the Act.145 This guidance is valuable to states because it assists
state enforcement officers in determining what types of action can be
prosecuted without concern for preemption by the OCC, in
developing standards for which practices should be considered
violations of their acts, and in deciding when to bring an action.
Specifically, the OCC stated that lending practices are deceptive if:
[f]irst, there is a representation, omission, act, or practice that is
likely to mislead; [s]econd, the act or practice would be likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer (a reasonable member of the group
targeted by the acts or practices in question); and [t]hird, the

142. Like state statutes, the FTC Act is broad and serves to protect consumers and
businesses from unfair and deceptive trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
143. GOODWIN PROCTER, supra note 117, at 56.
144. Id. at 57.
145. OCC Predatory Abuses Guidelines Letter, supra note 25, at 2, 4–6.
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representation, omission, act, or practice is likely to mislead in a
material way.146

A practice is considered unfair under the FTC Act if: “[f]irst, the
practice causes substantial consumer injury, such as monetary harm;
[s]econd, the injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer
or to competition; and [t]hird, the injury caused by the practice is
one that consumers could not reasonably have avoided.”147 Because
the terms “deceptive” and “unfair” are defined somewhat broadly
under this standard, states can tailor solutions to address the specific
types of abusive practices that are occurring within their jurisdictions.
Finally, in order to ensure that actions brought under state
deceptive trade practices acts have a deterrent effect on loan sellers
and those actors engaging in predatory practices, state lawmakers
should enact provisions giving consumers a private right of action
where one is not explicitly given.148 Many state deceptive trade
practices acts explicitly allow a private right of action, but others do
not.149 Because states often do not have the necessary resources to
investigate every violation and abuse of state laws, state lawmakers
should amend state acts to allow private rights of action. Also, some
states do not include credit as a good and lending as a service that is
covered under state deceptive trade practices acts.150 In such
instances, the necessary amendments should be made in order to
ensure adequate enforcement. Enforcement by states of deceptive

146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. The FTC Act does not allow any private right of action, but instead leaves
enforcement up to the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000) (giving the
Federal Trade Commission power “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce”).
149. See supra note 134.
150. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, stated:
Some State UDAP statutes do not include credit as a “good or service” to
which the Act applies, or lenders may be exempted from the list of
covered entities. Some State statutes prohibit “deceptive” practices, but
not unfair practices. In my State, we have no private right of action for
our UDAP statute, magnifying the impact of the problem of inadequate
resources for public enforcement. Other claims which might apply to a
creditors’ [sic] practices may be beyond the jurisdictional authority given
to public agencies.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 53, 62 (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of
Iowa).
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and unfair trade practices acts would therefore be an effective
deterrent that would not interfere with national bank lending powers
but would allow the states to tailor the remedy to fit the problems
that they are facing.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment illustrates that abusive and predatory lending
practices continue to be a significant problem in many parts of the
country. State and federal regulators are at odds in determining how
to deal with the problem. The OCC’s recent order preempting the
GFLA, its recent rulemaking which may result in the OCC
occupying the field of regulation of national real estate lending, and
the OTS’s preemption orders on the same topic provide evidence
that it is unlikely that states will be able to enact legislation
prohibiting specific lending terms and conditions that will be
effective against federally chartered banks. Federal regulatory
agencies seem willing to preempt any law that interferes with a
nationally chartered financial institution’s power to make real estate
loans.
It is therefore important that states develop remedies that do not
run afoul of OCC and OTS preemption principles. Because a
significant portion of predatory practices are engaged in by nonbank
sellers of loans that are regulated by states, state legislators should
develop laws that target sellers of loans, such as heightened licensing
requirements for loan originators, and the creation of state agencies
that enforce such requirements and punish lending abuses.
Additionally, states can effectively stop predatory practices through
enforcement of state unfair and deceptive trade practices acts against
federal and state-chartered financial institutions. These solutions can
be taken without impinging upon federal real estate lending powers.
Using these tactics, states may prevent predatory lending abuses
without interfering with national banking powers.
Christopher R. Childs
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